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Global Power Transition and the Future of 
the European Union 
Will EU Leaders Stop Missing Key Opportunities? 
Birol Yeşilada, Portland State University & Osman Göktuğ Tanrıkulu, 
Portland State University 
ABSTRACT 
Paper presented at the 2015 Conference of the European Union Studies Association in 
Boston, March 5-8. This paper applies power transition theory to EU’s future as a global 
power. It assesses economic and political/strategic capabilities of the EU vis-à-vis other 
global contenders as Transatlantic Alliance is challenged by rising powers in the east - 
China and India. Analysis includes simulations of how structural reforms (i.e fiscal 
union) and membership enlargement(s) are likely to affect EU’s ability to achieve its goal 
of becoming a global actor.  
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Introduction 
 
The future of the European Union (EU) rests on a delicate balance of policy challenges.  
On the one hand, recent financial crisis exposed EU’s failure to match economic and 
monetary union (EMU) with necessary integration along political union. Once more, it 
became crystal clear that monetary union cannot be sustained without a serious political 
union. An additional problem facing the EU on this front is unwillingness of Britain to 
fully commit itself to a true fiscal/political union.  On another policy front, EU’s security 
policies remain hostage of its worsening relations with Turkey. As EU pushed Turkey 
away from potential membership, this country’s Islamist oriented government reoriented 
its policies toward the Middle East and China while holding EU-NATO partnership in 
limbo. Result has been damaging for full implementation of Transatlantic security 
agenda with no resolution in sight. Yet, another failure concerns EU-Russia relations. 
For reasons discussed later, if Russia decides to lean more toward the East and withdraw 
from reliance on its current European trade partners, the prospects for a long peace may 
vanish as well on EU’s eastern borders.  There are no simple solutions out of these 
challenges unless EU leaders can reach a consensus on a serious fiscal union (political 
union) and repair relations with Russia and Turkey. 
  
The magnitude of the financial crisis is so grave that observers and analysts1 have 
concluded a big decision must be made regarding fiscal union (thus political union) to 
save EMU. Failure to formulate a viable fiscal union could derail Monetary Union and 
possible breakup the Eurozone. Not only does this problem threatens deepening of 
economic and monetary integration, it spills over to EU’s Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP), part of its overall Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and 
makes it difficult to complete EU-NATO partnership and enable Europe to meet 
challenges posed by rising powers like China and India. 
The Magnitude of Challenges Facing the EU 
The European Union provides the most interesting argument in favor of integration. The 
expectation is that members of such a community will grow faster and become more 
competitive largely due to economies of scale. In today’s competitive economy, societies 
that do not take advantage of all the opportunities are likely to fall behind and be unable 
to maintain continuous growth in the face of competitors with much larger markets and 
investment potential. The second argument is that integration reduces the likelihood of 
conflict among agents because they provide a modicum of consistent rules, make each 
component dependent on the others and presumably increase the level of trust among 
participants. Yet financial crisis, problems pertaining to future enlargement, and 
relations with Britain, Russia and Turkey also affect EU’s ability to formulate a viable 
CSDP. 
The Fiscal Union & the UK Challenge 
Whereas the EU represents the most successful and complex form of regional economic 
and political integration between sovereign member states, it is faced with the most severe 
financial crisis of its history. Moreover, the EU’s bold leap forward into EMU failed to 
make it the leader of global economy. Problems facing the EU are product of its unique 
1 For a detailed discussion of this crisis see proceedings of the conference on Redefining European 
Economic Governance  in College of Europe, Bruges March 1, 2012. 
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approach to regional economic integration that span sixty years of intergovernmental and 
supranational mix of policy making. Throughout its history, the EU has followed a 
continuing, though irregular, course of integration. It has been on a course that has 
always found a middle way between integration that is strictly economic in nature and 
integration that is strongly political, and it has, with each integrative step, brought 
institutional changes representing compromises between the principles of inter-
governmentalism and supranationalism.  The outcome of their collective efforts was the 
completion of the Common Market (Single Market) in 1992 that met the original intent 
of the Treaty of Rome. However, complex internal and external challenges that EU 
member states faced convinced them to take the next logical step in economic integration 
– Economic and Monetary Union. However, European leaders did not make a similar 
bold move in establishing a true political union. This shortcoming became the Achilles 
heal of EMU as seen in recent financial crisis and the inability of the EU to get itself out 
of the ensuing mess.  As Kugler, Fisunoglu, and Yesilada notes (2015:17) “reluctance and, 
in some cases, opposition among some members to deepening political union resulted in a 
lopsided regional integration characterized by: (1) EMU among 17 member states, (2) 
Economic Union between all members, and (3) intergovernmentalist political union.”   
 
Debate over the need of a fiscal, thus deeper political union remained. There are two 
schools of thought characterized the nature of the debate in the EU. According to one 
school monetary union could not survive in the long run unless a strong political union 
accompanied it and cited numerous historical cases to support its position. Going as far 
back to work of William Riker (1964) in his powerful analysis of the rise of a federated 
United States argued that confederations couldn’t succeed unless there are continuous 
positive gains for the members.  Indeed, he showed that the United States confederation 
collapsed when taxes were to be imposed on the US population. In a similar manner, this 
is the type of crisis that the EU faces today.  
 
1. Are EU members willing to support others? 
2. What are the limits of national as opposed to European actions? 
3. What are the consequences of the weakening or disintegration of the EU? 
The other school of thought maintains that the present degree of political union in the 
EU is sufficient for the long run survival of the monetary union and that there is no 
urgency of creating a federal structure in the Union similar to one found in the US. As 
De Grauwe (2009) correctly states, debate between these two views about the link between 
political and monetary union is somewhat difficult by a lack of clarity about the meaning 
of political union. One can look at a monetary union as a union between countries that 
use the same currency and have a single monetary authority. However, a political union is 
much more difficult to define because it involves several key policy issue areas and 
institutions of governance that could cover foreign and security policies, taxation, 
judiciary and similar policy areas.  
Political union affects monetary union in several ways. First, it makes it possible to 
centralize a large part of national budgets at the supranational level and enables 
significant fiscal transfers between states as insurance against asymmetric shocks. Second, 
it reduces the risk of asymmetric shocks that are political in nature.  When member states 
are independent in pursuing their respective fiscal policies, unilateral decision of any 
member to increase or lower taxes creates an asymmetric shock.  A simple Stability and 
growth Pact that followed EMU was simply insufficient to correct these imbalances as 
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apparent from the current crisis. The magnitude of the problem is reflected in another 
asymmetry that is found in the degree of integration between two camps of EU member 
states – thus creating a two-track EU. Moreover, failure to deepen political integration 
carries with it the danger of weakening collaboration on the CFSP/CSDP front.  Kugler 
et al demonstrated that how two-track EU emerged based on Genna’s (2003) Integration 
Achievement Score. Figure 1 provides a summary of what we mean by two-track EU. The 
two lines show different levels of integration between the two sets of member states – 
those who are in EMU and others that are outside the Euro zone. 
  
Figure 1: Integration in the EU 
 
 Source: Kugler, Fisunoglu, Yesilada, 2015: 49. 
 
Among the non-Eurozone EU countries, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark 
prefer nothing more than what one might call a loose confederal system of governance for 
political union. The UK’s opposition to further deepening of economic and monetary 
integration is exemplified by its resistance to fuller fiscal union and by its decision not to 
join the banking union.  On the other hand, a larger number of member states are willing 
to join the Eurozone as full participants. The recent addition of Eastern European 
nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 added Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania to the Union.  These nations in general are on a 
waiting list to join the Euro area. With such diverse commitment of members to future of 
full economic and monetary integration it is debatable if the EU could meet its ambition 
to be a global actor. 
 
It is fair to say that Britain has always been a dissatisfied partner in the Union, but it 
has never been as close as it is now to relinquishing its membership. Due to the 
devastating Euro Crisis, the European member states came to a state where further 
integration is the only suitable option to prevent any future crisis and save the European 
Union. For this reason, recently, members under Germany’s leadership have taken 
concrete steps towards some degree of fiscal union that is short of full fiscal union with a 
Treasury and EU level income tax. However, for a country, which has not even become a 
member of the Monetary Union, due to issues of national sovereignty and lack of 
European ideals, joining the fiscal union would be almost impossible. As a result, 
Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron announced the referendum option for British 
citizens, which stated that they would be able to make the decision whether to stay or 
leave the European Union.  This move clearly annoyed other EU member states that want 
Britain to make a decision, and refrain from using departing from the EU as a 
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bargaining tool. Under increasing pressure from other big powers in the EU to “play ball” 
it is conceivable that UK might chose to leave the EU.  Most Britons favor UK leaving 
the EU according to a survey by Daily Mail (October 20, 2012).  The British politicians 
are divided over the matter and the Economist outlined the benefits and costs of such a 
move (December 8, 2012). It should be noted, however, that UK’s potential departure 
would not only affect Britain’s economic and political relations with the EU but would 
also affect the Union’s aspirations to be a global actor as it competes with other giants on 
the world scene – namely China, India, and the United States (Yesilada et al. 2006). 
However, no one knows exactly what the benefits and challenges would be for Britain and 
the EU if Britain leaves the EU, or if it stays. We will address this in the Analysis 
Section of the paper. 
Problems with CSDP 
The EU’s CSDP is important for regional integration demonstrating that the Union is not 
a mere economic enterprise and aims to place Europe as a global power in every respect of 
that term.  As Wolfgang Wessels and Franziska Bopp explain:  
 
The provisions for CFSP and, increasingly also the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP), can be regarded as the cornerstone of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Furthermore, the challenges the Union faces within the international system are 
ever growing and requiring an ever-increasing scope of action across different 
policy fields, geographical regions and arenas of policy-making. This makes the 
policy field a very relevant, although sometimes diffusing research area as three 
types of foreign interactions intertwine: traditional national foreign policy, the 
foreign policy of the EU as prescribed in the treaty articles on CFSP and CSDP, 
and the EC external relations, which concentrate on long-standing and mostly 
economic foreign relations and development policy.  
(Wessels and Bopp 2008:1) 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss CDSP’s evolution but it should suffice to say 
that as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP became embedded in a whole range of 
other EU policies that have implications for external action by member states. The 
Lisbon Treaty elevated the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to a Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, while still being within CFSP) and made it clear 
that this change indicates a greater willingness by member states to develop a military 
arm of the EU – yet without a greater push for a more a supranational approach. The 
reference to partnership with NATO as the foundation of member states’ security policy 
(for those who are members of NATO) is proof of an intergovernmentalist approach to the 
CSDP. This is apparent in upholding of Article 17 of the Treaty of the European Union 
by the Lisbon Treaty (ToL, Art. 28A, par. 2) reasserting “progressive framing of a 
common Union defense policy will lead to a common defense, when the European 
Council, acting unanimously, so decides.” It is clear from recent developments that the 
CFSP needs NATO for territorial defense of the EU. In most, if not all, of its overseas 
operations the EU relied on the assistance of NATO in one way or another. Thus, the 
phrase “separable, but not separate” describes the current partnership between the CSDP 
and NATO. Since the enlargement of NATO and the European Union in 2004 and the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union in 2007, the organizations 
have 21 member countries in common (see Figure 2).   
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Figure 2. Transatlantic and Other Affiliated Countries Overlapping Defense 
Commitments 
 
  
Source:  IISS, European Military Capabilities, p.3. 
 
 
It is not surprising that the current partnership framework heavily relies on NATO 
capabilities, more precisely on the US’s heavy lift aircraft and advanced spy satellites, in 
advancing the CSDP of the Union. The reliance of the CFSP on the U.S. becomes more 
clear when one considers the future defense expenditures of these Allies.  According to a 
report by the Financial Times (November 17, 2010:9), the EU suffers not only from 
declining defense expenditures but also from heavy over duplication of its members’ 
defense infrastructure.  Figure 3 shows defense expenditures for the EU and US during 
2001-2009. 
 
Figure 3. EU-US Defense Expenditures ($million in 2010 prices) 
 
 
Source: SIPRI (http://www.sipri.org/databases/). 
 
The observed trend is likely to get worse when one considers planned defense budget cuts 
among NATO’s leading EU members for reasons related to fiscal austerity following the 
financial crisis. Since 2008, NATO members have been reducing their defense budgets 
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while Russia has been steadily increasing its defense spending (Jonathan Beale, BBC, 
February 25, 2015). 
 
 
Table 1: Military Expenditures 
  
 
 
 
 
Contrast this with Russia's defense spending, which is rising from 3.4% of its GDP this 
year to 4.2% in 2016 ($81bn or £52.2bn). Russia is also stepping up its military activities 
and is actively seeking to draw Turkey away from NATO by signing a lucrative gas 
agreement with that country’s government. At the same time, Russia signaled that it is a 
potential source of credit to Greece if this country’s government does not secure a 
favorable deal from Eurozone finance ministers.  One additional example of how Russia 
is actively undermining EU’s CSDP is the new agreement it signed with Cyprus that 
grants Russian navy access to Cypriot ports (BBC February 25, 2015).  The Cyprus 
government also acknowledged that the two countries were discussing the possibility of 
Russia using an air base on Cyprus for humanitarian relief missions. All this happening 
as Cyprus maintains that it wants to be a full participant in EU-NATO partnership and 
desires to join NATO! 
 
As if these developments did not create enough challenges for EU’s CSDP, members 
continue to duplicate their defense industries to such an extent that collective efficiency is 
nonexistent.  A strong intergovernmental approach to the CFSP and CSDP assures that 
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each member state continues to maintain national defense industries rather than 
determine which country should specialize in manufacturing of which weapons systems.  
This further complicates integrated defense systems and fails to achieve economies of 
scale. Currently the EU has 21 naval shipyards compared to 3 in the US, 89 different 
European weapons programs as opposed to 27 American systems, and Europe has 11 
different tank productions while the US has two. Moreover, technological advantage of 
American defense industries continues to put the US ahead of her European allies.  
Moreover, the new members of the EU that also joined NATO (former Communist states) 
continue to present a costly modernization program for these countries’ militaries.  
Without a fully integrated EU-NATO partnership, and a deeper political union among 
EU member states, the European side of the Alliance will continue to feel the pressure of 
falling behind the US and will remain a junior partner. The bottom line is that until EU 
members formulate an integrated and optimized defense industries, their expenditures in 
this area will continue to be inefficient and present an obstacle in developing costly 
systems, i.e., heavy lift capability aircraft, which would reduce Europe’s dependence on 
the Americans. 
 
Problems with Turkey and the Russian Challenge 
Turkey 
It can be argued that the EU could significantly bolster its defense capabilities if Turkey 
were to become a member of the Union. Findings by scholars (Grant 2005, Hughes 2004, 
Independent Commission 2009, Onis 2008, Tocci 2007, and Yesilada 2012) show that for 
the EU, having Turkey as a member would make significant contributions to Union’s 
CFSP and energy security, and contribute to regional stability. It will also go a long way 
in showcasing to the rest of the world that EU is not a Christian club.  These are 
monumental opportunities that should not be overlooked by officials in Brussels and EU 
capitols.  Yet, shortsighted policies of some of the member states’ governments threaten 
realization of this historic opportunity. 
 
However, given all the current problems surrounding this topic, how could Transatlantic 
Allies find a compromise position? In other words, would it be possible or acceptable to 
bring Turkey into the CSDP prior to full membership in the EU?  It is in this area that 
Turkey, representing a crucial link in the EU-NATO partnership and one which is an 
important factor in the future development of the Union’s CSDP, can turn the table on 
those member states opposing its accession. Until recently, Turkish governments carefully 
balanced their foreign and security policies between their European and NATO Allies 
(primarily the US).  Today, however, this is hardly the case.  Since the failed Annan Plan 
(2004) to reunite Cyprus followed by accession of only the Greek part of that country to 
the Union and the subsequent election of anti-Turkey governments in France and 
Germany, relations between EU-Turkey took a turn to the worse.  
 
The alternative scenario of closing the door on Turkey is far more dangerous and 
unpredictable. It could result in numerous outcomes including one where Turkey stop 
viewing the EU as a friend and partner, turns its back on Europe and looks to the East 
and/or South. There are several scenarios hypothesized by observers of EU-Turkey 
relations that include one where Turks could also look at Russia, and possibly China, as 
future strategic partners. As Cengiz Aktar noted (Bilefkey 2009)  “the West should fear a 
wounded Turkey turning to Russia. Already, Russia has been courting it as a distribution 
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point for energy supplies, while Turkish investment in Russia is intensifying. . .This 
government is perfectly capable of saying ‘no thanks’ to Europe and instead shifting 
toward Russia.”  Recent decision by the Turkish government to purchase Chinese anti-
missile system that cannot be integrated in to NATO’s defense infrastructure further 
underscores how far the Erdogan government is willing to push the envelope in 
reorienting Turkey’s defense strategies. As for AKP’s natural preferences for foreign 
relations, the global financial crisis had contracted European economies, prompting 
Turkey, a large exporter, to seek different markets and that leaders of AKP felt more at 
home in Riyadh, Damascus and Baghdad than in Paris, London or Rome.  Indeed, this 
has been the focus of AKP’s foreign policy during the last several years and has caused 
serious damage to Turkey’s relations with Israel while raising concerns in Washington. 
 
The immediate impact of post-Annan Plan developments can also be seen in the level of 
trust affected people held towards the EU (see Figure 4).  The figure shows steady and 
then sharp decline in EU support among these peoples. It is interesting to note that 
among the Cypriots it is the Greeks who display least favorable view towards the EU.  One 
wonders what this picture would look like today in light of financial bailout terms the 
EU wants to impose on Greek Cypriot bank depositors.  Turkish Cypriots, on the other 
hand, are more favorable towards the EU, which could be explained as a sign of 
desperation.  Everyday life in north Cyprus is plagued with crime, worsening public 
services, corruption, and overt Islamization activities imposed upon the Turkish Cypriots 
by the AKP government in Turkey.  Although unhappy with how they were treated by the 
EU after the Annan Plan, broken promises and all, the Turkish Cypriots see their 
emancipation only through the EU. 
 
Figure 4: Support for EU Among Cypriots and Turks 
 
 
 
Source:  Figures obtained from Eurobarometer surveys. 
 
This figure also supports the argument that since 2004 public opinion towards the EU has 
been on a decline among Turks.  Recently, Birol Yesilada (2012) showed a direct 
relationship between decline in public opinion support for EU in Turkey and Turks’ 
perception of anti-Turkey EU policies and mistreatment of Turkish Cypriots.  To make 
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matters worse, the AKP government seems less than enthusiastic to continue with 
Copenhagen reforms and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has fueled anti-European 
public sentiment by equally damaging outbursts. As far as the Turks are concerned, the 
blame is on the Europeans.   
Russia  
When it comes to EU’s security policies (economic and political), one can argue that 
Russia is the elephant in the room.  While EU-US and Russia disagreements began to 
emerge as NATO expanded into former Soviet areas, the two sides still continued to 
cooperate on nuclear agreements and proceeded to discuss a cooperation agreement under 
President Clinton and President Yeltsin.  However, this agreement did not materialize 
before the first expansion of NATO. About this time, a great opportunity to anchor Russia 
as a link between West and China was lost and subsequent rise to power of Putin in 
Russia further added to growing dissatisfaction of this country with NATO’s strategic 
ambitions.  
 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent bloodshed in eastern Ukraine is the 
first major conflict at the border of East and West since World War II. In response to the 
illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia’s aggressive military intervention in eastern 
Ukraine, the West has imposed heavy economic sanctions on Russia. These developments 
represent the deepest plunge in U.S.-EU-Russian relations since the Cold War. Western 
leaders had hoped economic measures would suffice to pressure Kremlin to change its 
political course in Ukraine. Instead, such policies simply serve to further push Russia 
into closer relationship with China. Vladimir Putin continues to back separatist forces in 
Ukraine and signed a 30-year gas agreement with China worth $400 billion 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-10/russia-china-add-to-400-billion-gas-
deal-with-accord).  According to Kugler and Tuzova (2015) the emergent Sino-Russian 
coalition creates a link between very large military powers that have large populations 
and growing economies that might by mid-century match or surpass that of G7.  Such 
comprehensive security, economic, and military cooperation between Russia and China 
weakens any attempts by the West to change Russia’s behavior by economic sanctions. 
There is a danger that China-Russia interactions will continue to increase, particularly if 
China perceives a threat from the West.  The size of the joint territories, populations, 
natural resources, and technology will make the alliance of the two countries a major 
force in world politics.  
Power Transition Analysis of EU’s Future 
Power Transition theory provides a useful perspective to analyze how the EU would fair 
in its global competition with other great powers.  The theory is based on A. F. K. 
Organski’s (1958) pioneering work that describes a hierarchical global system. According 
to this theory, the distribution of power in the international system is uneven. Power 
Transition specifies the relative roles of nations within this hierarchy, the system of 
governing rules, and then outlines how powerful countries attempt to manage global 
politics. Power Transition paints a picture of world politics that is integrated 
horizontally and vertically (Tammen 2000, Kugler and Tammen 2012).  Additional 
application of this theory is found in Lemke (2002) who made a major breakthrough 
moving Power Transition toward a general theory of world politics by demonstrating the 
applicability of this perspective to regional hierarchies. His careful empirical analysis 
shows that the same principles that hold at the global level define interactions within 
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regional hierarchies as shown in Figure 5. Members of regional hierarchies interact with 
each other. Understanding regional hierarchies adds complexity and generality to the 
Power Transition perspective. Global powers like the US, EU, Russia and soon China can 
directly intervene to alter outcomes in a region. They are able to interact, of course, but on 
matters of strategic importance it is a one-way street. There is more reason and 
opportunity for global powers to intervene in those other regions (Efird et al. 2003; 
Yesilada et al. 2006). This interferes with the ability of regional powers to operate under 
the normal rules.  Lemke informs us that the rules within regional hierarchies normally 
match those at the global level but the ability of global powers to intervene does not make 
this an exact parallel (Lemke 1996, 2002; Lemke and Reed, 1996). 
 
Dynamically, the theory stipulates that political interactions among nations are based on 
the varying commitment among national elites to the existing institutional status quo. 
This broad acceptance of international rules and norms determines whether a country is 
satisfied or dissatisfied with its position in the hierarchy and trust that the institutions 
created advances their interests. The most powerful nations hold a position at the top of 
the global or regional hierarchy. The dominant nation attempts to manage the regional 
system with a coalition of stable, satisfied supporters. When agreement is in place, the 
dominant nation can ease the process of integration. When disagreements emerge among 
large nations who do not trust the institutions created, integration comes to a standstill or 
recedes.  Power Transitions perspective tells us that currently, the United States is the 
dominant power in the international power hierarchy. According to the same perspective, 
at present, the great powers are China, the EU, India, and Russia are also regional powers 
in their respective geographic regions. 
 
Figure 5: Global and regional hierarchies 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kugler, Yeşilada, & Fisunoğlu,  “Consequences of Reversing the EU Integration” (2015:7) 
  
 
According to Power Transition theory, power defines the conditions of war and peace in 
the international system. Power is defined as the ability to make opponents comply with 
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demands. Power is composed of three elements: population, economic productivity (GDP) 
and the ability of the political system in extracting resources from society. Population is 
an essential component of the power equation; however, in order to be relatively powerful, 
population must be more productive than the rivals. High political capacity is the other 
requirement to be powerful or developed. Politically capable governments can relatively 
extract more resources and utilize them for national goals (Kugler and Tammen 2012). 
 
In addition to power and status quo dynamics, power transition theory includes the 
concept of hierarchal relationships among global and regional powers.  An unordered 
hierarchy is one where most nations hold roughly equal shares of power.  This situation 
presents the most likely conditions for conflict and the least likely conditions for 
integration. The reason is that nations in uniform hierarchies face few power constraints 
and are only restrained by the degree of satisfaction with the status quo. In the absence of 
a regionally dominant country supporting the status quo, competition among two or more 
contenders is the rule to resolve disputes among parties that vie for control of the region.  
Thus, conflict is more likely to occur within a uniform hierarchy as each contender with 
different interests and incentives attempts to impose its influence upon the region. In 
uniform hierarchies, the larger powers focus on protecting themselves from emerging 
challengers.  In this context even when nations are satisfied with each other, cooperation 
is less likely.  
 
Asymmetric hierarchies are characterized by power concentrated in the hands of a 
dominant global or regional power that establishes and supports the status quo. In 
structural environments where the dominant nation is at least twenty percent stronger 
than any contender, the hierarchy is deemed ordered (Organski and Kugler 1980). The 
dominant nation can spend more of its resources ensuring the best support possible for the 
economic and political terms established in the status quo. In an asymmetric 
environment, war may still be waged, but it is less likely and will result in relatively low 
casualties – as is the case in the ongoing “war against terrorism”.  
 
Efird (2001) and Efird, and Genna (2002) and Efird et.al. (2003) extended the theory and 
argued that the development of regional integration after a power transition between two 
satisfied powers improves because the formerly less powerful country has a vital interest 
in not only maintaining but also furthering and institutionalizing the arrangements that 
it believes to have contributed to its rise. Efird and Genna’s statistical test provides strong 
support for their hypothesis.  Efird (2001) expanded in Efird et.al. (2003) argued that the 
following relationship captures the dynamics preceding conflict and cooperation in the 
international system: 
 
   
 
Where; 
CI = Conflict = Integration;   
RP = Relative Power;  
S = Status Quo;  
Hc = Hierarchy of Challenger; and  
HD = Hierarchy of Defender 
 
 
( ) Dc HHRPSRPCI ++−= 3
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Assumptions behind this model can be found in various works and are summarized in 
Yesilada, Efird, and Noordijk (2006).  First, when relative power is at parity, the severity 
of conflict is maximized because both sides anticipate an equal probability of success. 
Formal work on the median voter theory indicates that this insight is consistent with 
rational expectations. Indeed, as Black anticipated, when two candidates with opposing 
points of view enter an election they will attempt to reach the median first-- assuring 
them of victory. Contested elections are those where the outcome is unclear – i.e. the last 
two Presidential elections in the US. Moreover, when parity is approached and policy 
differences are fundamental, tempers flare and electoral conflicts escalate to direct 
confrontations.  The same process takes place in world politics. When nations are 
satisfied with international norms (S>0) the cubed RP term shifts the highest propensity 
for conflict past the parity point. Thus, greater asymmetry improves the likelihood of 
cooperation assuming that the dyad is at least somewhat jointly satisfied, especially when 
dyads are highly asymmetric. Further, Organski and Kugler (1980:59) found that the 
dissatisfied challenger initiates conflict in the post-transition period pointing to a cubed 
RP term. Such results proved again to be consistent with later formal proofs. Kugler and 
Zagare (1986), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Alsharabati (1997) show game 
theoretically that the defender does not preempt at preponderance because it values the 
status quo and prefers to postpone action. On the other hand, the dissatisfied challenger is 
willing to wage war since the highest likelihood of success is anticipated after the 
transition point.   
 
Operationalization of this model’s variables is based on estimation of following indicators 
(Tanrikulu 2013).  Relative power is the capacity of one nation to influence another 
either by persuasion or by force. The more relatively powerful a nation is, the more 
capable it is to impose its preferences on the others in its hierarchy. In this model GDP at 
purchasing power parity (with 2005 US Dollars) will be used to measure power. Since it is 
intended to run a simulation with the model until 2050, GDP data is taken from 
International Futures version 6.69. In trying to determine how influential the UK can be 
against German leadership, relative power is going to be taken as follows: 
 
RP=  
 
The closer the level of GDP of the challenger to the dominant power, the less orderliness 
there is in that hierarchy. Therefore, the higher the level of UK’s GDP relative to 
Germany’s, the lower the level of orderliness will be in the European hierarchy. This 
situation is captured by the formula because an increase in RP will be reflected as an 
increase in the conflict-integration score, meaning a higher probability of conflict. When 
Germany’s GDP level increases more than the UK’s GDP, RP will start to get smaller and 
decrease the probability of conflict on the conflict- integration continuum.  
 
The satisfaction variable represented with ‘S’ in the formula defines whether the RP will 
create conflict or not. As it is mentioned before, two Eurobarometer questions related to 
‘trust’ and ‘membership’ are going to be used to account for the level of satisfaction with 
the status quo. The survey question data related to ‘trust’ and ‘membership’ are in 
percentages. To be able to use these data in the conflict- integration formula, it is rescaled 
between -1 to 1. As a result, percentages between 50 to 0 are rescaled between 0 to -1, and 
percentages between 50 to 100 are rescaled between 0 to -1. When the level of satisfaction 
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is below 50%, it is going to be transformed into a negative number representing 
dissatisfaction between 0 and -1, and due to the negative sign before the ‘S’ variable in the 
formula, the dissatisfaction level will cause an increase on the continuum representing an 
increase in the level of conflict. If the level of satisfaction is higher than 50%, rescaling 
the number will transform it into a positive number between 0 to 1, and due to the 
negative sign before the ‘S’ variable in the formula, the model will perceive it as an 
increasing level of cooperation/ integration.  
 
The data of the question related to ‘trust’ is adjusted to be able to use in the conflict- 
integration model. It should be noted that data of the question related to trust between 
1999 and 1993 is missing. This missing period is interpolated to be able to use in the 
formula. Furthermore, data on the first question ‘trust’ does not go back to 1973 like the 
data of the second question regarding ‘membership’. Therefore, the ‘trust’ data is 
extrapolated from 1993 to 1973, which is the date when the UK became a member of the 
Union.               
 
The trust variable captures the level of satisfaction with the status quo better than the 
alliance portfolios. In classic Power Transitions analysis, the similarity of alliance 
portfolios have been used to measure the level of satisfaction with the status quo. The 
similarity of alliance portfolios is calculated via dyadic relationships. It is inferred that 
“dyads with similar portfolios are satisfied with each other’s view of the international 
system or dyadic relationship, and those with dissimilar portfolios are regarded as less 
satisfied with each other” (Efird, Kugler, & Genna, 2003, p. 297). However, this 
measurement comes with two fundamental problems in terms of what this paper assesses. 
First, similarity of alliance portfolios does not directly account for the status quo. Second, 
dyadic relationship does not capture the behavior or interaction of multiple countries. 
Encapsulating multiple countries functioning is significant especially when there is a 
certain level of integration between multiple countries. When countries go into 
integration, the rules and guidelines of the integration become the status quo. In this 
situation, to be able to account satisfaction, one should directly focus on integration 
instead of dyadic alliance similarities. Therefore, directly representing the European 
integration, trust and membership variables capture the level of satisfaction with the 
status quo.    
 
The cubed RP term in the formula captures the propensity for conflict in Power 
Transitions. If the RP term in the interactive part of the equation were linear, each unit 
increase of RP would cause equal increases on the conflict- integration continuum. If RP 
were squared, it would not reflect the likelihood of conflict at parity points. Since 
RP=PowerChallenger/PowerDominant, the formula should reflect the probability of conflict 
once the relative power of the challenger increases in terms of the dominant power. It is 
anticipated that the likelihood of conflict peaks when the challenger and the dominant 
power are in parity. For this reason, squaring RP would underemphasize the amount of 
conflict. However, cubing RP gives the highest propensity for conflict right after the 
challenger passes the parity point with the defender. Additionally, the cubed RP also 
reflects the higher probability of cooperation when the asymmetry between the dominant 
power and the challenger increases (Efird et al., 2003). 
 
HD and HC reflect the relative power of the dominant power in terms of all the contenders 
in the region. The calculations of these variables are as follows: 
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HD =  
 
HC =  
 
When the power of the dominant country decreases compared to the contenders in the 
hierarchy, the total of HC and HD increases to reflect the increasing propensity for 
conflict. When the powers of the contenders increase compared to the dominant power, 
HC’s increase will be more than HD’s decrease to reflect higher propensity for conflict. 
The model will first take the regional contenders as UK, France, Italy, Spain and Poland.  
 
Analysis 
Given the growing power of China in world affairs and its implications for global power 
transition (Kugler and Tammen 2005, Tammen at. all. 2005), we looked at how different 
scenarios of EU integration/disintegration would affect global power transition and its 
impact on EU’s competitiveness in the international system. Figure 6 compares how a 
fully integrated EU fairs in global competition with other great powers. Results, which 
are updates of previous calculations (Kugler, Yesilada, Fisunoglu 2015), are sobering. 
Both Western powers (EU and US) will be overtaken by China and India as the dominant 
economies in the world.  By the end of the 21st century the EU and its likely ally the US 
are expected to have half the economic power of China and India, and one-third the size 
of their respective populations.  
 
Figure 6: The timeline of USA, EU, China, and India, 1960-2100. 
 
 
 
 
China or India alone will have the overall capabilities of the United States and the 
current EU. These Asian giants will no doubt dominate global affairs in the next century. 
For this reason an expansion of the EU and the recreation of an Atlantic alliance are 
central if the western nations are to play a principal role in the next Century.  
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Figure 7 shows the regional consequences of a more integrated Eurozone led by Germany 
that excludes large free riders like the UK, compared with the European Union and an 
enlarged European Union that includes Turkey. The United States is added to provide a 
size comparison This four dimensional graph presents total output to assess the size of the 
society in y-axis and population to assess the future potential of the society in x-axis. The 
size of the bubble is the GDP per capita to approximate the productivity of the 
population. Lastly, the time dimension is embedded through the ﬂow of bubbles. The 
initial bubbles, which start near the origin, stand for the year 1960, and the outermost 
bubbles, where the labels are attached, stand for the year 2100. Each bubble in-between 
represents a year from 1960 to 2100. Bubbles linked by lines indicate EU expansions.  
 
 
Figure 7: USA, European Union (with or without Turkey), and Eurozone, 1960–2100 
 
 
 
 
Results indicate that a smaller Eurozone could become more of a federation but at the 
expense of reducing much of the population and power capability of the current Euro-
pean Union. While not inconsequential, this unit would represent about half of the power 
of the United States and less than half its population. The current European Union 
would be closer to 75% of the United States. This situation points out a classic Catch-22. A 
smaller Euro group would be cohesive, but would have far less capacity to incorporate 
other large members and would be less powerful at the global level. A more 
intergovernmental European Union that reverts back to a Single Market could attract 
more new potential large members. Yet, with reduced trust, it would be less powerful at 
the global level for lack of cohesiveness. 
 
We next looked at the consequences of reversing EU integration with two scenarios – one 
with Britain leaving and another where Germany leaves the Union.  Figures 8 and 9 
provide results for these simulations.  In the case of German withdrawal from the 
Eurozone, this country will become a minor player on the world scene (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8:  The timeline of Germany, USA, China, and India, 1960-2100. 
 
 
 
 
As for the UK, the results are very similar to those of Germany. If Britain withdraws 
from the EU, it will be a minor player on the world stage (Figure 9). Results clearly 
indicate that the UK would lose its economic and political power in the global system if it 
departs from the EU. As a single country, it is not possible for the UK to keep up with the 
rising Asian powers: China and India. The deeper the level of integration with the EU, 
the higher the UK’s level of influence will be in the international system.    
 
Figure 9:  Forecasting UK’s departure from the EU, 1960 – 2100 
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For the EU, the benefit of having a powerful member is smaller than the costs it brings. 
If Britain leaves the EU, this would be a serious loss in terms of its level of capability. 
However, the debt crisis showed that commitment to the integration is more important 
than the level of GDP to sustain the Union as a global actor. The EU has to avoid any 
conflict directed to the integration process coming from the members. Otherwise, the 
Union would lose its coherence and become a weaker actor in the international arena. If 
Britain is going to stay in the EU, it is significant that it has the European vision for 
integration. Including Britain into further level of integration without enough 
commitment for the Union would jeopardize the integration process. If the UK is 
included in further level of integration without enough commitment, the propensity of 
conflict will be higher. To avoid further conflict, a two-tract formulation can be 
formulated. Thus Britain and similar countries can take that track, which is a lower 
level of integration, until they have the vision for further integration (Tanrikulu 2013).  
 
The future of both the UK and the EU is bound to their ability to compromise and 
cooperate. Realizing its own capacity and the future power transitions in the global arena 
should make the UK appreciate its EU membership. On the other hand, the EU should 
work for methods that will increase the coherence of the member states. Mechanisms that 
will keep the less commitment members apart will save the speed and the development of 
the integration process. The highest level of utility in the long run can only come with 
higher level of cooperation.     
 
As if these internal challenges of the EU were not enough, Russia now represents a 
serious problem for Transatlantic Allies. Events in Ukraine destroyed any hope of erasing 
mistrust between NATO and Russia that emerged after expansion of the Atlantic Alliance 
to former Soviet republics of Central and Eastern Europe.  Moreover, increasing economic 
sanctions are likely to cause serious problems for the Russian economy and this, in turn, 
will fuel more anti-Western sentiment among the Russians.  There is no doubt that 
Putin’s actions have isolated his country from the developed world and he has 
increasingly turned toward China for economic agreements to offset the impact of 
Western sanctions. There is no realistic option available for Putin to challenge the West 
on his own as shown by data in Figure 10.  Prospects for the Russian economic power are 
grim, as it will lose ground to other regional powers. In a serious way, Russia is 
increasingly becoming dependent on China and given the fact that both of these countries’ 
leaders are dissatisfied with the status quo international regimes they are likely to form a 
Sino-Russian coalition to challenge the Transatlantic Allies. 
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Figure 10:  Future growth of the Russian economy relative to major powers 
 
 
 
Source: Jacek Kugler and Yelena Tuzova (2015). 
 
 
We next applied conflict=cooperation estimation of Efird, Genna, and Kugler (2003) to 
UK-EU and Transatlantic (EU+US) – China dyads to show prospects for future relations 
between these countries.  Figures 11 and 12 show results of these relationships. 
 
 
Figure 11: Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation, EU & US-China, 2000-2050 
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Figure 11: Forecasting the probability of conflict between the UK and the EU  
 
 
  
 
These results show that in case of Transatlantic-China relations, probability of conflict 
increases in line with rising power of China that was shown and discussed above.  A 
dissatisfied China is likely to confront current dominant powers as parity is reached by 
mid-century. In this competition, China is likely to look for additional allies, like 
dissatisfied Russia, to further increase its capacity to challenge the Western alliance. 
 
With regard to internal EU relations, the UK is currently in no position to challenge the 
other countries until it reaches parity with Germany by 2030 – give or take a few years.  
If UK’s dissatisfaction persists during this period, then we observe a gradual increase in 
probability of conflict (gradually intensifying with each passing year) beginning around 
2035. This rising propensity of conflict is a serious threat on the European integration 
process and should be of concern for current EU leadership as they debate future of the 
Union. 
Conclusions and Prospects 
This analysis shows that implications of problems facing EU integration are far more 
complex than finding a quick fix to its current financial crisis.  Failure to achieve a 
realistic fiscal union (political union) has serious implications for EU members to fulfill 
their obligations in another policy domain – namely CSDP.  Recent slowdown in EU 
integration not only adds to regional problems, but it also has serious consequences for the 
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economic stability of the international system. Moreover, the slowdown in integration 
that previously reduced tensions within the European region could reset the stage not only 
for regional confrontations but also to increase the likelihood of a global conflict. Missed 
opportunities with Russia and Turkey have set in motion developments that could 
seriously alter the balance of power at the systemic level that could only benefit China.   
 
Regionally and globally the EU cannot afford to move from the cooperative contest to a 
confrontational one, i.e. the UK breaking away or Germany dropping out of the 
Eurozone, where solutions are arrived at by force rather than reason. EU leaders need to 
resolve the current crisis in the EMU, build upon it to reinvigorate the integration 
process and provide a path for complete regional integration that includes a real political 
union. The alternative scenarios of member states reverting back to pre-Maastricht or pre-
Single European Act years are simply non-starters for the future of a stable European 
Union and global peace. 
 
 
References 
 
Alsharabati, C. (1997) Dynamics of War Initiation unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Claremont Graduate University. 
Bilefsky, D. (2009) “Angers of Rejecting Turkey,” New York Times,  October 27. 
Black, D., (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision Making, Econometrica 16 245-261. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B, and D. Lalman. (1992). War and Reason, Yale University Press. 
Daily Mail (October 20, 2012). “Most Voters Want Britain to Leave EU: Support for 
Pulling Out at Highest Level for 30 Years”. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2220778/Most-voters-want-Britain-leave-EU-Support-pulling-highest-level-30-
years.html 
De Grauwe, P. (2009). Some thoughts on Monetary and Political Union. In The Future of 
the EMU, edited by Leila Simona Talani. London and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Efird, B. (2001). From Conflict to Integration: A Generalized Power Transition 
Dynamic. Ph.D. Dissertation: School of Politics and Economics, Claremont 
Graduate University. 
Efird, B., and G. Genna. 2002. Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional 
Integration. European Union Politics 3(3). 
Efird, B., G. Genna, and J. Kugler. (2003) “From War to Integration: Generalizing the 
Dynamic of Power Transitions.” International Interactions 29(4):293–314. 
Genna, G. (2002). Changing Power, Sovereignty, and Loyalty in the European Union. 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Claremont Graduate University. 
Genna, G., and T. Hiroi (2004). Power Preponderance and Domestic Politics: Explaining 
Regional Economic Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: 1960–1997. 
International Interactions, 30(1): 143–165. 
Grant, C. (2005) “Turkey offers EU more punch,” Center for European Reform Comment 
and Analysis, (Published by European Voice, September, 1-7). 
Hughes, E. (2011). Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The politics of exclusion? 
London: Routledge. 
Hughes, K. (2004) Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement? 
Brussels: Friends of Europe. 
Yeşilada and Tanrıkulu 22 
Independent Commission on Turkey (2009) Turkey in Europe: Breaking the vicious 
circle, Open Society Foundation and the British Consul. 
Kugler, J. and Y. Tuzova (2015). “Implications of Demographic, Economic, and Political 
Shifts in Eurasia.” Paper presented at the 2015 Annual Conference of the 
International Studies Association in New Orleans, February 18-21. 
Kugler, J. A. Fisunoglu and B. Yesilada (2015). “Consequences of Reversing the European 
Union Integration” Foreign Policy Analysis 11: 45-67. 
Kugler, J. and R. Tammen eds. (2012). The Performance of Nations. Boulder: Rowman 
and Littlefield. 
Kugler, J., R. Tammen & Efird, B. (2004). Integrating Theory and Policy: Global 
Implications of the War in Iraq. International Studies Review, 6(4), 163–179. 
Tammen, R. and J. Kugler. (2005).  “China: Satisfied Or Dissatisfied: The Strategic 
Equation.”  Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies 
Association in Honolulu, Hawaii. March 1-4. 
Kugler, J. and F. Zagare (1986) Exploring the Stability of Deterrence, Colorado: 
Westview Press 
Lemke, D. (2002). Regions of War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lemke, D., and W. Reed (1996) Regime Type and Status Quo Evaluations: Power 
Transitions the Democratic Peace Proposition. International Interactions 22:143–
164. 
Organski, A.F.K. (1958) World Politics, New York: Alfred A. Knop. 
Organski, A.F. K. and Kugler, J. (1980) The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Öniş, Z. (2008) “Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate,” Insight Turkey, 
vol. 10, 35-50. 
Riker, W. (1964). Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Tammen, R., et al. (2000) Power Transitions: Strategic Policies for the 21st Century. New 
York: Chatham House. 
Tanrikulu, O. (2013) A Dissatisfied Partner: A Conflict-Integration Analysis of Britain’s 
Membership in the European Union. Masters thesis. Portland State University. 
Tocci, N. (2007)  The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard, 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Wessels, W. and Boop, F. (2008) “The Institutional Architecture of CFSP After the 
Lisbon Treaty,” Research Paper No. 10. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies.  
http://www.ceps.eu.  
Yesilada, B. (2012) EU-Turkey Relations in the 21st Century. London: Routledge. 
Yesilada, B. and D. Wood (2010. The Emerging European Union. 5th edition. New York: 
Longman. 
Yesilada, B., B. Efird, and P. Noordijk (2006). “Competition among Giants: A Look at 
How Future Enlargement of the European Union Could Affect Global Power 
Transition,” International Studies Review Vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2006):607-622. 
 
 
